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Abstract: The financial crisis has produced a generalized rise of the liquidity 
risk on the money markets. The purpose of this article is to highlight the 
mechanisms of contagion between the money markets of the United States, the 
United Kingdom and the Euro Zone. To give an account of these mechanisms, a 
BEKK model, in which we introduce a structural break, is adopted. Thus, this 
model explicitly tests the spillover effects of the liquidity risk premium on 
money markets. The results show that before the financial crisis (i.e. the 
reference period), the spillover effects are observed on money markets, as a 
result of the interconnectedness of these markets, whereas over the crisis period, 
the liquidity problems go from the United Kingdom to the American money 
market and then to the euro area. 
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 I. Introduction 
The upsurge of the financial crisis stems directly from the solvability crisis of the least 
well-off American households who took out subprime mortgages. From August 2007, the 
solvability crisis has turned into a bank liquidity crisis that has contributed to the spread of 
international upheaval. The bank liquidity issue has since appeared as the Gordian knot of the 
financial crisis (suspicion between financial institutions, credit restrictions, etc.). 
This paper focuses on the major issue of liquidity on the money markets. It sets out to 
achieve two purposes. It seeks to analyse the dynamics of bank liquidity problems in the 
United States, the Euro Zone and the United Kingdom through the evolution of the interest 
rate spreads between LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) and OIS (Overnight Index 
Swaps) on the different money markets. It aims to show the growing intensity of difficulties 
encountered by financial institutions in this matter. In an original way, this paper means to 
highlight the spreading process of strain on liquidity by testing potential causal connections 
between the spreads of the three money markets. By extension, it will attempt to reveal the 
truth about the causes of this liquidity crisis: did it too start in America? Did tensions in 
American money markets really spread to European markets as suggested by some authors: 
"This week a year ago, on 9 August 2007, a French investment house announced that it would 
suspend redemption of shares held by investors on a few of its enhanced-return euro money 
market funds. The reason for this move was that the market, for some of the paper in which 
these funds had invested, US-dollar denominated asset-backed commercial paper, had 
collapsed. With this announcement, the credit crisis - which was to broaden into a fullblown 
financial crisis - had started in earnest" (Deutsche Bank, Global Economic Perspectives, 
August 4, 2008). 
To shed light on these questions, the BEKK model, named after the bivariate model 
proposed by Baba et al. (1989) has been adopted. This model reveals in particular the 
spreading mechanisms governing the evolution of variances and covariances in discrepancies 
between LIBOR and OIS interest rates over time. The originality of our modelling lies with 
the introduction of a structural break in the equation of central tendency and equations of 
conditional variances and covariances (as proposed by Beirne et al., 2008). Taking this break 
into account  first exposed with the technique used by Westerlund (2006)  helps to 
explicitly test the potential modifications of the overspill phenomenon between money 
markets.  
This article is organized in the following way: the second section analyses the 
meaning of the spreads of interest used, as well as their evolution between January 2007 and 
November 2008. The third section presents the adopted econometric model (BEKK with a 
structural break) and specifies the results obtained. Finally, the last section provides a 
conclusion to our study.  
 
II. Amplification of liquidity problems on money markets 
 
Banks make two types of banking operations on the money market to manage liquidity 
(or cash-flow): non-secured operations and repurchase transactions. These operations lead to 
risk-taking: credit risk (or counterparty risk) and liquidity risk (or market risk).  
To deal with these risks, banks can resort to the derivatives market, in particular to the 
overnight index swaps market (OIS) in order to guard against events unforeseen by LIBOR, 
i.e. the unexpected degradation of the borrower situation and non-anticipated changes in 
liquidity demand addressed to the creditor and to the market (Kwan 2009), as well as CDS 
(credit default swap) to hedge against credit risk.      
Of these two types of risks, credit risk for non-secured operations and overnight index 
swaps operations is almost non-existent, these operations being of short maturity. Therefore, 
spread between LIBOR and OIS hardly reflects the credit risk premium. It thus mainly reveals 
the liquidity premium amount
5
. Indeed, the OIS is the fixed-leg rate in the coupon swap. The 
variable rate is an overnight rate; the interests from the variable leg are capitalized and are 
subjected to maturity payment in the same way as interests from the fixed-leg. The LIBOR is 
a cash rate in the sense that the creditor immediately releases (at contract signature) liquidities 
to transfer them to the borrower whereas there is no immediate cash released with the OIS 
(cash swap occurs at maturity providing there is a gap between rates). Consequently, the 
spread between LIBOR and OIS primarily reflects the intensity of bank liquidity problems.  
In this paper, we will proceed to analyse three daily series of spread between LIBOR 
and OIS three months apart, in the United States, the Euro Zone
6
 and the United Kingdom.  
 [Figure 1] 
During the first semester of 2007 before the financial crisis arose, spreads seemed 
quite stable, around 5-6 base points for the Euro Zone, 7-8 base points in the United States 
and 10 base points in the United Kingdom. None of these markets appeared to be the driving 
force for the overall dynamics of the three markets.  
On August 9, 2007, the spread between LIBOR and OIS increased in all the markets. 
In the United States, it rose by 13 base points on the 8
th
 to 34 on the 9
 th
 and 49 on the 10
th
. In 
the Euro Zone, it rose by a smaller proportion by 11 to 18 points and 27 points on the 10
th
. In 
the United Kingdom, the increase was even more moderate, from 20 to 25 then 32 points. 
This rise in liquidity price can be linked to upheavals that were then affecting the pricing 
system of sophisticated financial products. Indeed, the growing rise of uncertainty (and thus 
                                                 
5
 The discrepancy between IBOR and REPO from which is substracted the CDS discrepancy also helps to 
measure the liquidity premium. The liquidity premium thus obtained is very close to the IBOR-OIS discrepancy 
that we have adopted in this study. (cf. ECB, 2008, p. 144)  
6
 For an analysis of the Euro Area money market we may refer to the article published by the ECB in February 
2009. 
of the liquidity premium) came from the implementation of an increasingly complex 
securitization system that made risk pricing more and more difficult (Gonzalez-Paramo 
(2008); Zagaglia (2008)). As a result, the first American defaults warned operators that they 
were short of information for risks associated with these new financial products: they began to 
have doubts. On August 9, 2007, uncertainty was so acute that BNP-Paribas suspended the 
calculation of the net asset values of three of its funds.  
From August 9, the European Central Bank reacted by injecting liquidities (€94.8 
billion) and the Fed injected in turn $24 billion. On August 13, both banks again injected €48 
billion and $2 billion respectively into banks. These measures had limited impact on the 
liquidity risk: the spread increased until September 12, 2007.  
[Figure 2] 
Over this period, the liquidity risk appeared to be more significant in the United States 
and the United Kingdom than in the Euro Zone, for the situation of banks in the Euro Zone 
appeared to offer better security against liquidity issues.  
Subsequently, the liquidity risk fell in the United Kingdom by about 50 points: this fall 
could be related to the emergency aid granted on September 14 by the Bank of England to 
Northern Rock, the fifth largest bank in Great Britain. Spreads stabilized to similar levels 
between September 21 and November 14, 2007.   
Spreads shot up again from November 15: the rise was halted on December 7 for the 
dollar, December 11 for the pound and December 7 for the euro. This reversal could be 
explained by the concerted support measure from five central banks (the European Central 
Bank, the Fed, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada and the Bank of Switzerland) which 
injected liquidities on December 12. Over this period, as shown by the figure above, the euro 
spread seemed to lag behind the movements affecting the dollar and pound sterling.  
Spreads reached minimum levels on January 29 for the euro and the pound and on 
January 30 for the dollar. Subsequently, they rose until April 16 for the pound, April 30 for 
the dollar and May 14 for the euro. Then, until mid-September 2008, spreads stabilized 
around 70 base points. This relative stability was certainly linked to the support measures 
from the Fed and the American Treasury to help a number of the organisations in 
difficulty (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on July 13, 2008). 
[Figure 3] 
September 15, 2008 marked a break in the trajectory of liquidity risk. The 
announcement of the failure of Lehman Brothers (the fourth largest investment bank on Wall 
Street) led to a sharp rise in spreads. The “too big to fail” principle that seemed to be 
governing rescue actions from authorities on an international level was abandoned. It then put 
an end to the moral hazard induced by systematic rescue. This option made operators think 
that other institutions were not shielded from a similar sanction. After this episode, interbank 
loans were considered riskier, rates on money markets shot up and liquidity problems grew 
worse. Unsecured loans seemed frozen as suspicion became widespread amongst bankers. As 
shown in figure 3, the LIBOR-OIS spread soared after the failure of Lehman Brothers. It 
peaked on October 10 with 366 base points for the dollar and 194 base points for the euro. For 
the pound, the spread kept on increasing until November 6, 2008 (it then reached 298 base 
points), while it fell in the United States and stabilized in the Euro Zone. During this period of 
extreme tension, risk remained lower for the euro.  
At the end of 2008, the problems of liquidity slowly decline so that we can consider, at 
the end of May, the return to a „normal‟ situation, according to Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan 
(Bloomberg, May 26, 2009) 
This description of the evolution of liquidity risk suggests that support from central 
banks had, at best, helped to stabilize the liquidity premium level rather than sharply reduce it. 
Each period of tension on money markets implied a long-term and cumulative rise between 
LIBOR and OIS. This hysteresis effect may be explained by the observed substitution 
between repurchase transactions and non-secured operations (LIBOR). Indeed, on money 
markets, repurchase transactions were preferred to non-secured actions as they naturally offer 
better security. Considering the increase of counterparty risk, it was more precisely 
repurchased transactions on Treasury bills that were preferred to non-secured transactions 
(without guaranty). Accordingly, the interest rate on repurchase transactions with Treasury 
bills security decreased so much that it dropped below the LIBOR or the OIS (Hördahl and 
King, 2008). The absorption of liquidity on the interbank market led to a rise in the LIBOR in 
such a way that the spread between the LIBOR and OIS rose.  
The liquidity crisis associated with the financial crisis gives food for thought over the 
existence of contagion mechanisms that could have been set between the different money 
markets. We would like to determine more particularly, the extent to which the periods of 
strain on money markets in the Euro Zone and Great Britain together with the subsequent 
BCE and Bank of England‟s support actions, may be primarily explained by the rise in the 
liquidity risk on the American money market or whether the absorption of liquidity was 
simultaneous on the markets we are studying.  
 
III. Frame of analysis and findings 
 
To highlight the potential links between three variables Y1, Y2 and Y3, representing 
more specifically the daily variances in spread rates observed in the United States, the United 
Kingdom and the Euro Zone over the period from January 3, 2002 to June 22, 2009, the 
BEKK model with a structural break (Beirne et al., 2008) has been adopted. This model helps 
to evidence propagation mechanisms that govern the evolution of variances and covariances 
of these variables over time. 
In order to bring to the fore the specificity of the contagion mechanism during the 
financial crisis, we distinguish two subperiods a “reference” period from January 3, 2002 to 
August 8, 2007 and the financial crisis period from August 9, 2007 to June 22, 2009.  
Can the three series be directly modelized over this period with a muli-variate 
autoregressive BEKK-type model? To do so, unit-root tests must conclude with the rejection 
of H0 (chart 1). Yet, as shown by tests performed on level series (ADF test with constant) and 
over the period from January 3, 2002 to August 8, 2007, this hypothesis can never be rejected 
irrespective of the chronicle studied. However, over the financial crisis period, we have to 
reject the null hypothesis at a 5% level: the spreads are non-stationnary. 
[Chart 1 here] 
Considering the acute increase of the spread that existed in money markets after the failure of 
Lehman Brothers, we introduce a structural break on September 15, 2008 over the financial 
crisis period. 
 
We then proceed to the multivariate modelling of the three series. The model adopted 
is a trivariate BEKK model over the reference period and a trivariate BEKK model with 1 
structural break over the financial crisis period. In matrix form, this last model is written:  
Equations of average values: 
/1/ Yt = t  + [I - t] +  Yt-1 + t 
Where Yt is a column vector with three components: Yt‟ = [Y1t, Y2t, Y3t];  (resp. ) is 
likewise the column vector with three components: constants that prevail from September,
 
2008 (resp., before this date); is the supposed diagonal matrix of autoregressive coefficients 
to the order of one; finally, t is an identity matrix of dimension 3 as from August 9, 2007 and 
nil before this date.     
Equations of conditional variances – covariances  
We set Ht as the symmetrical matrix of conditional variances and covariances of jt errors:  
Ht = 
1 1, t 1 2 , t 1 3 , t
1 2 , t 2 2 , t 2 3 , t
1 3 , t 2 3 , t 3 3 , t
h h h
h h h
h h h
 
 
 
 
 
 
Generically, we modelize these conditional variances and covariances as follows: 
/2/ Ht = C' t C + D‟ [I -t] D + 
  + A' t t t' A + B' t [I-t] t' B + 
  + G' Ht-1t G + F‟ Ht-1 [I - t] F 
Considering the way the t matrix is constructed, we note that the C, A and G matrices are 
those of coefficients governing the evolutions of conditional variances – covariances from the 
structural break; matrices D, B and F are those prevailing before this break.  
Matrices C and D have, whatever the hypothesis made subsequently on the propagation 
mechanism, a superior triangular structure:  
C = 
1 1 1 2 1 3
2 2 2 3
3 3
c c c
0 c c
0 0 c
 
 
 
  
 D = 
1 1 1 2 1 3
2 2 2 3
3 3
d d d
0 d d
0 0 d
 
 
 
  
 
The structure of matrices A, B, F and G varies according to the hypothesis made on the 
spreading mechanism of volatility levels.  
The “complete” model M1 introduces no restrictions on these volatilities propagation 
mechanisms: the conditional variance in zone i is determined not only by its own lag but also 
by those of conditional variances of other zones:  
A = 
1 1 1 2 1 3
2 1 2 2 2 3
3 1 3 2 3 3
a a a
a a a
a a a
 
 
 
  
  B = 
1 1 1 2 1 3
2 1 2 2 2 3
3 1 3 2 3 3
b b b
b b b
b b b
 
 
 
  
 G = 
1 1 1 2 1 3
2 1 2 2 2 3
3 1 3 2 3 3
g g g
g g g
g g g
 
 
 
  
 F = 
1 1 1 2 1 3
2 1 2 2 2 3
3 1 3 2 3 3
f f f
f f f
f f f
 
 
 
  
 
 
The “triangular” model M2 postulates an oriented propagation Y3  Y2  Y1. It is 
materialized by a restriction of nullity concerning the superior triangle of each A, B, G and F 
matrices: 
A = 
1 1
2 1 2 2
3 1 3 2 3 3
a 0 0
a a 0
a a a
 
 
 
  
 B = 
1 1
2 1 2 2
3 1 3 2 3 3
b 0 0
b b 0
b b b
 
 
 
  
 G = 
1 1
2 1 2 2
3 1 3 2 3 3
g 0 0
g g 0
g g g
 
 
 
  
 F = 
1 1
2 1 2 2
3 1 3 2 3 3
f 0 0
f f 0
f f f
 
 
 
  
 
According to this scheme, the conditional variance in zone 3 can only depend on its own lags 
while the one in zone 1 depends both on its own lag and on lags of the conditional variances 
of zones 2 and 3.   
Lastly, the “diagonal” model supposes that each variance and covariance never depends only 
on its own lags and squares or cross-products of corresponding lagged-innovations. The 
structure of matrices A, B, G and F is of a diagonal type:  
A = 
1 1
2 2
3 3
a 0 0
0 a 0
0 0 a
 
 
 
  
 B = 
1 1
2 2
3 3
b 0 0
0 b 0
0 0 b
 
 
 
  
 G = 
1 1
2 2
3 3
g 0 0
0 g 0
0 0 g
 
 
 
  
 F = 
1 1
2 2
3 3
f 0 0
0 f 0
0 0 f
 
 
 
  
 
The equations of variances and covariances associated with each of these three models are 
reproduced in annex 1.   
 
Chart 2 provides the values obtained for the log-likelihood function of the sample associated 
with the triangular model for each potential scheme of propagation over the two subperiods 
considered.  
[Chart 2 here] 
From this table it ensues that if a “triangular”-type model should challenge the complete 
model, the UK → EuroZone → USA scheme would be favoured over the reference period. 
However, the UK → USA → EuroZone scheme would be adopted over the financial crisis 
period. It is thus on the basis of this scheme that several tests on various restrictions that may 
be added to coefficients and correspond to different propagation schemes
7
. More precisely, 
are tested:  
- H0: model M2 versus HA: model M1 
- H0: model M3 versus HA: model M2 
[Chart 3 here] 
We can firmly deduce that the “complete” model must be favoured over the reference period. 
However, the “triangular” model (UK → USA → EuroZone scheme) must be chosen over the 
financial crisis period.  
These results must mainly be explained by the interconnectedness of banks‟ international 
balance sheets. Indeed, Banks‟ foreign positions have surged since 2000: the stock of foreign 
claims grew from $11 trillion at end-2000 to $31 trillion by mid-2007 (the year-on-year 
growth in foreign claims approached 30% by mid-2007) (Mc Guire and von Peter, 2009). 
Hence, over the reference period, this interconnectedness of banks‟ balance sheets implied a 
manifold propagation scheme. 
Before the financial crisis period, the long position in dollar of UK banks, as foreign claims 
were predominantly in dollars: more than $300 billion by mid-2007. UK banks maintained 
largely balanced net interbank US dollar positions (i.e. cross currency funding) (BIS, 2009). 
Hence, the liquidity problems on the British money market, primilarly due to an inadequate 
monetary policy as the BoE did not provide liquidity as fast and as much as the other central 
                                                 
7
 When these tests involve model M2, we always work with a “triangular” propagation scheme UK → EuroZone 
→ USA over the reference period and UK → USA → EuroZone over the financial crisis period. 
banks, have mainly been propagated to the US money market and to a less extent to the euro 
money market. Furthermore, dislocations in FX swap markets over the financial crisis period 
made more expensive to obtain US dollars via currency swaps (Baba, N., Packer, F. (2008)) 
which has reinforced liquidity problems and the speed of contagion. 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper, focused on the major issue of liquidity on money markets, has set out to 
highlight several phenomena and produce several findings. The analysis of the dynamics of 
bank liquidity issues in the United States, the Euro Zone and the United Kingdom through the 
evolution of the interest rate spread between LIBOR and OIS in various money markets 
indicates the growing intensity of the liquidity risk as suspicion grew between financial 
institutions. From this perspective, the failure of Lehman Brothers marked a break: after 
September 15, 2008 the price of liquidity shot up. Support actions from central banks only 
served to contain tensions around liquidity between August 2007 and September 2008 and 
they seemed overwhelmed by the growing distrust amongst financial institutions thereafter.  
Then, in an original and novative manner, the article has highlighted the propagation 
process of the liquidity crisis by testing, with a trivariate BEKK model in which a break was 
introduced, the causal links between spreads in the three money markets. Tests could evidence 
the following results. Over the period of analysis chosen for the econometric study (i.e. from 
January 3, 2002 to June 22, 2009), we see that over the reference period (before the beginning 
of the financial crisis on August 9, 2007), the overspill between money markets was manifold: 
interest spreads interacted. Over the financial crisis period, the propagation scheme goes from 
the UK money maket to the US money market and then to the Euro money market: the bank 
liquidity crisis would not have come specifically from America but rather from the United 
Kingdom.  
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Annex 1: conditional variances and covariances in the different models  
 
“Complete” model M1 
h11 t =1 t
2
 c11
2
 + 2 t
2
 d11
2
 + 1 t a11 1 t-1 (1 t a11 1 t-1 + 1 t a21 2 t-1 + 1 t a31 3 t-1)  
 + 1 t a21 2 t-1 (1 t a11 1 t-1 + 1 t a21 2 t-1 + 1 t a31 3 t-1)  
 + 1 t a31 3 t-1 (1 t a11 1 t-1 + 1 t a21 2 t-1 + 1 t a31 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b11 1 t-1 (2 t b11 1 t-1 + 2 t b21 2 t-1 + 2 t b31 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b21 2 t-1 (2 t b11 1 t-1 + 2 t b21 2 t-1 + 2 t b31 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b31 3 t-1 (2 t b11 1 t-1 + 2 t b21 2 t-1 + 2 t b31 3 t-1)  
 + f11 (2 t f11 h11 t-1 + 2 t f21 h12 t-1 + 2 t f31 h13 t-1) + g11 (1 t g11 h11 t-1 + 1 t g21 h12 t-1 + 1 t g31 h13 t-1)  
 + f21 (2 t f11 h12 t-1 + 2 t f21 h22 t-1 + 2 t f31 h23 t-1) + g21 (1 t g11 h12 t-1 + 1 t g21 h22 t-1 + 1 t g31 h23 t-1)  
 + f31 (2 t f11 h13 t-1 + 2 t f21 h23 t-1 + 2 t f31 h33 t-1) + g31 (1 t g11 h13 t-1 + 1 t g21 h23 t-1 + 1 t g31 h33 t-1)   
 
h22 t =  1 t
2
 c12
2
 + 1 t
2
 c22
2
 + 2 t
2
 d12
2
 + 2 t
2
 d22
2
 + 1 t a12 1 t-1 (1 t a12 1 t-1 + 1 t a22 2 t-1 + 1 t a32 3 t-1)  
 + 1 t a22 2 t-1 (1 t a12 1 t-1 + 1 t a22 2 t-1 + 1 t a32 3 t-1)  
 + 1 t a32 3 t-1 (1 t a12 1 t-1 + 1 t a22 2 t-1 + 1 t a32 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b12 1 t-1 (2 t b12 1 t-1 + 2 t b22 2 t-1 + 2 t b32 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b22 2 t-1 (2 t b12 1 t-1 + 2 t b22 2 t-1 + 2 t b32 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b32 3 t-1 (2 t b12 1 t-1 + 2 t b22 2 t-1 + 2 t b32 3 t-1)  
 + f12 (2 t f12 h11 t-1 + 2 t f22 h12 t-1 + 2 t f32 h13 t-1) + g12 (1 t g12 h11 t-1 + 1 t g22 h12 t-1 + 1 t g32 h13 t-1)  
 + f22 (2 t f12 h12 t-1 + 2 t f22 h22 t-1 + 2 t f32 h23 t-1) + g22 (1 t g12 h12 t-1 + 1 t g22 h22 t-1 + 1 t g32 h23 t-1)  
 + f32 (2 t f12 h13 t-1 + 2 t f22 h23 t-1 + 2 t f32 h33 t-1) + g32 (1 t g12 h13 t-1 + 1 t g22 h23 t-1 + 1 t g32 h33 t-1)  
 
h33 t =   1 t
2
 c13
2
 + 1 t
2
 c23
2
 + 1 t
2
 c33
2
 + 2 t
2
 d13
2
 + 2 t
2
 d23
2
 + 2 t
2
 d33
2
  
 + 1 t a13 1 t-1 (1 t a13 1 t-1 + 1 t a23 2 t-1 + 1 t a33 3 t-1)  
 + 1 t a23 2 t-1 (1 t a13 1 t-1 + 1 t a23 2 t-1 + 1 t a33 3 t-1)  
 + 1 t a33 3 t-1 (1 t a13 1 t-1 + 1 t a23 2 t-1 + 1 t a33 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b13 1 t-1 (2 t b13 1 t-1 + 2 t b23 2 t-1 + 2 t b33 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b23 2 t-1 (2 t b13 1 t-1 + 2 t b23 2 t-1 + 2 t b33 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b33 3 t-1 (2 t b13 1 t-1 + 2 t b23 2 t-1 + 2 t b33 3 t-1)  
 + f13 (2 t f13 h11 t-1 + 2 t f23 h12 t-1 + 2 t f33 h13 t-1) + g13 (1 t g13 h11 t-1 + 1 t g23 h12 t-1 + 1 t g33 h13 t-1)  
 + f23 (2 t f13 h12 t-1 + 2 t f23 h22 t-1 + 2 t f33 h23 t-1) + g23 (1 t g13 h12 t-1 + 1 t g23 h22 t-1 + 1 t g33 h23 t-1)  
 + f33 (2 t f13 h13 t-1 + 2 t f23 h23 t-1 + 2 t f33 h33 t-1) + g33 (1 t g13 h13 t-1 + 1 t g23 h23 t-1 + 1 t g33 h33 t-1) 
 
h12 t = 1 t
2
 c11 c12 + 2 t
2
 d11 d12 + 1 t a12 1 t-1 (1 t a11 1 t-1 + 1 t a21 2 t-1 + 1 t a31 3 t-1)  
 + 1 t a22 2 t-1 (1 t a11 1 t-1 + 1 t a21 2 t-1 + 1 t a31 3 t-1)  
 + 1 t a32 3 t-1 (1 t a11 1 t-1 + 1 t a21 2 t-1 + 1 t a31 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b12 1 t-1 (2 t b11 1 t-1 + 2 t b21 2 t-1 + 2 t b31 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b22 2 t-1 (2 t b11 1 t-1 + 2 t b21 2 t-1 + 2 t b31 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b32 3 t-1 (2 t b11 1 t-1 + 2 t b21 2 t-1 + 2 t b31 3 t-1)  
 + f12 (2 t f11 h11 t-1 + 2 t f21 h12 t-1 + 2 t f31 h13 t-1) + g12 (1 t g11 h11 t-1 + 1 t g21 h12 t-1 + 1 t g31 h13 t-1)  
 + f22 (2 t f11 h12 t-1 + 2 t f21 h22 t-1 + 2 t f31 h23 t-1) + g22 (1 t g11 h12 t-1 + 1 t g21 h22 t-1 + 1 t g31 h23 t-1)  
 + f32 (2 t f11 h13 t-1 + 2 t f21 h23 t-1 + 2 t f31 h33 t-1) + g32 (1 t g11 h13 t-1 + 1 t g21 h23 t-1 + 1 t g31 h33 t-1)   
 
h13 t = 1 t
2
 c11 c13 + 2 t
2
 d11 d13 + 1 t a13 1 t-1 (1 t a11 1 t-1 + 1 t a21 2 t-1 + 1 t a31 3 t-1)  
 + 1 t a23 2 t-1 (1 t a11 1 t-1 + 1 t a21 2 t-1 + 1 t a31 3 t-1)  
 + 1 t a33 3 t-1 (1 t a11 1 t-1 + 1 t a21 2 t-1 + 1 t a31 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b13 1 t-1 (2 t b11 1 t-1 + 2 t b21 2 t-1 + 2 t b31 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b23 2 t-1 (2 t b11 1 t-1 + 2 t b21 2 t-1 + 2 t b31 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b33 3 t-1 (2 t b11 1 t-1 + 2 t b21 2 t-1 + 2 t b31 3 t-1)  
 + f13 (2 t f11 h11 t-1 + 2 t f21 h12 t-1 + 2 t f31 h13 t-1) + g13 (1 t g11 h11 t-1 + 1 t g21 h12 t-1 + 1 t g31 h13 t-1)  
 + f23 (2 t f11 h12 t-1 + 2 t f21 h22 t-1 + 2 t f31 h23 t-1) + g23 (1 t g11 h12 t-1 + 1 t g21 h22 t-1 + 1 t g31 h23 t-1)  
 + f33 (2 t f11 h13 t-1 + 2 t f21 h23 t-1 + 2 t f31 h33 t-1) + g33 (1 t g11 h13 t-1 + 1 t g21 h23 t-1 + 1 t g31 h33 t-1)   
 
h23 t =  1 t
2
 c12 c13 + 1 t
2
 c22 c23 + 2 t
2
 d12 d13 + 2 t
2
 d22 d23  
 + 1 t a13 1 t-1 (1 t a12 1 t-1 + 1 t a22 2 t-1 + 1 t a32 3 t-1)  
 + 1 t a23 2 t-1 (1 t a12 1 t-1 + 1 t a22 2 t-1 + 1 t a32 3 t-1)  
 + 1 t a33 3 t-1 (1 t a12 1 t-1 + 1 t a22 2 t-1 + 1 t a32 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b13 1 t-1 (2 t b12 1 t-1 + 2 t b22 2 t-1 + 2 t b32 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b23 2 t-1 (2 t b12 1 t-1 + 2 t b22 2 t-1 + 2 t b32 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b33 3 t-1 (2 t b12 1 t-1 + 2 t b22 2 t-1 + 2 t b32 3 t-1)  
 + f13 (2 t f12 h11 t-1 + 2 t f22 h12 t-1 + 2 t f32 h13 t-1) + g13 (1 t g12 h11 t-1 + 1 t g22 h12 t-1 + 1 t g32 h13 t-1)  
 + f23 (2 t f12 h12 t-1 + 2 t f22 h22 t-1 + 2 t f32 h23 t-1) + g23 (1 t g12 h12 t-1 + 1 t g22 h22 t-1 + 1 t g32 h23 t-1)  
 + f33 (2 t f12 h13 t-1 + 2 t f22 h23 t-1 + 2 t f32 h33 t-1) + g33 (1 t g12 h13 t-1 + 1 t g22 h23 t-1 + 1 t g32 h33 t-1)  
 
“Triangular” model M2 
h11 t =1 t
2
 c11
2
 + 2 t
2
 d11
2
 + 1 t a11 1 t-1 (1 t a11 1 t-1 + 1 t a21 2 t-1 + 1 t a31 3 t-1)  
 + 1 t a21 2 t-1 (1 t a11 1 t-1 + 1 t a21 2 t-1 + 1 t a31 3 t-1)  
 + 1 t a31 3 t-1 (1 t a11 1 t-1 + 1 t a21 2 t-1 + 1 t a31 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b11 1 t-1 (2 t b11 1 t-1 + 2 t b21 2 t-1 + 2 t b31 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b21 2 t-1 (2 t b11 1 t-1 + 2 t b21 2 t-1 + 2 t b31 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b31 3 t-1 (2 t b11 1 t-1 + 2 t b21 2 t-1 + 2 t b31 3 t-1)  
 + f11 (2 t f11 h11 t-1 + 2 t f21 h12 t-1 + 2 t f31 h13 t-1) + g11 (1 t g11 h11 t-1 + 1 t g21 h12 t-1 + 1 t g31 h13 t-1)  
 + f21 (2 t f11 h12 t-1 + 2 t f21 h22 t-1 + 2 t f31 h23 t-1) + g21 (1 t g11 h12 t-1 + 1 t g21 h22 t-1 + 1 t g31 h23 t-1)  
 + f31 (2 t f11 h13 t-1 + 2 t f21 h23 t-1 + 2 t f31 h33 t-1) + g31 (1 t g11 h13 t-1 + 1 t g21 h23 t-1 + 1 t g31 h33 t-1)   
 
h22 t =  1 t
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2
 + 2 t
2
 d12
2
 + 2 t
2
 d22
2
 + 1 t a22 2 t-1 (1 t a22 2 t-1 + 1 t a32 3 t-1)  
 + 1 t a32 3 t-1 (1 t a22 2 t-1 + 1 t a32 3 t-1) + 2 t b22 2 t-1 (2 t b22 2 t-1 + 2 t b32 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b32 3 t-1 (2 t b22 2 t-1 + 2 t b32 3 t-1)  
 + f22 (2 t f22 h22 t-1 + 2 t f32 h23 t-1) + g22 (1 t g22 h22 t-1 + 1 t g32 h23 t-1)  
 + f32 (2 t f22 h23 t-1 + 2 t f32 h33 t-1) + g32 (1 t g22 h23 t-1 + 1 t g32 h33 t-1)  
 
h33 t =   1 t
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2
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2
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2
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2
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2
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2
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2
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2
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 + 2 t f33
2
 h33 t-1 + 1 t g33
2
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h12 t = 1 t
2
 c11 c12 + 2 t
2
 d11 d12 + 1 t a22 2 t-1 (1 t a11 1 t-1 + 1 t a21 2 t-1 + 1 t a31 3 t-1)  
 + 1 t a32 3 t-1 (1 t a11 1 t-1 + 1 t a21 2 t-1 + 1 t a31 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b22 2 t-1 (2 t b11 1 t-1 + 2 t b21 2 t-1 + 2 t b31 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b32 3 t-1 (2 t b11 1 t-1 + 2 t b21 2 t-1 + 2 t b31 3 t-1)  
 + f22 (2 t f11 h12 t-1 + 2 t f21 h22 t-1 + 2 t f31 h23 t-1) + g22 (1 t g11 h12 t-1 + 1 t g21 h22 t-1 + 1 t g31 h23 t-1)  
 + f32 (2 t f11 h13 t-1 + 2 t f21 h23 t-1 + 2 t f31 h33 t-1) + g32 (1 t g11 h13 t-1 + 1 t g21 h23 t-1 + 1 t g31 h33 t-1)   
 
h13 t = 1 t
2
 c11 c13 + 2 t
2
 d11 d13 + 1 t a33 3 t-1 (1 t a11 1 t-1 + 1 t a21 2 t-1 + 1 t a31 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b33 3 t-1 (2 t b11 1 t-1 + 2 t b21 2 t-1 + 2 t b31 3 t-1)  
 + f33 (2 t f11 h13 t-1 + 2 t f21 h23 t-1 + 2 t f31 h33 t-1) + g33 (1 t g11 h13 t-1 + 1 t g21 h23 t-1 + 1 t g31 h33 t-1)   
 
h23 t =  1 t
2
 c12 c13 + 1 t
2
 c22 c23 + 2 t
2
 d12 d13 + 2 t
2
 d22 d23 + 1 t a33 3 t-1 (1 t a22 2 t-1 + 1 t a32 3 t-1)  
 + 2 t b33 3 t-1 (2 t b22 2 t-1 + 2 t b32 3 t-1)  
 + f33 (2 t f22 h23 t-1 + 2 t f32 h33 t-1) + g33 (1 t g22 h23 t-1 + 1 t g32 h33 t-1)  
 
“Diagonal” model M3 
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h12 t = 1 t
2
 c11 c12 + 2 t
2
 d11 d12 + 1 t
2
 a11 a22 1 t-1 2 t-1 + 2 t
2
 b11 b22 1 t-1 2 t-1 + 2 t f11 f22 h12 t-1 + 1 t g11 g22 h12 t-1   
 
h13 t = 1 t
2
 c11 c13 + 2 t
2
 d11 d13 + 1 t
2
 a11 a33 1 t-1 3 t-1 + 2 t
2
 b11 b33 1 t-1 3 t-1 + 2 t f11 f33 h13 t-1 + 1 t g11 g33 h13 t-1   
 
h23 t =  1 t
2
 c12 c13 + 1 t
2
 c22 c23 + 2 t
2
 d12 d13 + 2 t
2
 d22 d23 + 1 t
2
 a22 a33 2 t-1 3 t-1 + 2 t
2
 b22 b33 2 t-1 3 t-1 + 2 t f22 
f33 h23 t-1 + 1 t g22 g33 h23 t-1  
 
Chart 1  
Unit-root tests (ADF) for each series of spreads  
(From) 
 Period: 
January 2, 2002  
to August 8, 2007 
Period: 
August 9, 2007  
to June 22, 2009 
 t-Statistic Prob. t-Statistic Prob. 
Spread_us_3M -4.24 0.00 -2.02 0.28 
Spread_euro_3M -4.74 0.00 -2.40 0.14 
Spread_bp_3M -6.00 0.00 -1.97 0.30 
Unit-root tests: the number of lags is automatically determined on the basis of the Min(SIC) criterion. The Prob.column provides the risk 
threshold from which it becomes possible to reject H0 
 Chart 2   
Log likelihood function of the “triangular” type BEKK model  
 
Propagation scheme  Log L 
 Period: 
January 2, 2002  
to August 9, 2007 
Period: 
August 10, 2007  
to June 22, 2009 
USA → EURO → UK 12991.8 959.1582 
USA → UK → EURO 13292.98 1054.25 
EURO → USA → UK 12590.62 960.5722 
EURO → UK → USA 13018.38 1849.287 
UK → USA → EURO  13297.23 1989.113 
UK → EURO → USA 13337.91 1912.941 
 
Chart 3  
Tests on restrictions that may be added to the different models  
 
  Period: 
January 2, 2002  
to August 8, 2007 
Period: 
August 10, 2007  
to June 22, 2009 
 
Null 
hypothesis 
Alternative 
hyp.  
Chi2 – 
Stat  
P – 
Value  
Chi2 – 
Stat  
P – 
Value  
Restrictions : nullity of 
coefficients 
M2 
(triangular) 
M1 
(complete) 
22.57 0.001 12.87 0.17 
a12, a13, a23, b12, b13, b23, g12, g13, 
g23, f12, f13, f23 
M3 
(diagonal) 
M2 
(triangular) 
11.35 0.0781 135.77 0.00 
a21, a31, a32, b21, b31, b32, g21, g31, 
g32, f21, f31, f32 
 
 Figure 1:  
Spreads between the LIBOR and OIS over the whole period 
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Figure 2: 
Spreads between the LIBOR and OIS between January 3, 2002 and August 8, 2007 
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 Figure 3:  
Spreads between the LIBOR and OIS between August 9, 2007 and June 22, 2008 
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